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The separation of powers doctrine has, in recent years, become a popular concept
with the Ohio Supreme Court. The court cited the doctrine as the reason for
invalidating portions of Ohio’s newly revamped criminal code2 and wielded it when
striking down one of Ohio’s most comprehensive tort reform bills.3 Despite its
1
B.B.A., Ohio University (1999); J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law
(2002); LL.M., Georgetown University Law Center (2003).
2
See State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 89 Ohio St. 3d 132, 729 N.E.2d 359 (2000) (finding
“bad-time” provisions of the Ohio Criminal Code invalid under a separation of powers
theory).
3
See State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 715
N.E.2d 1062 (1999) (striking down House Bill 350 for, inter alia, separation of powers
violations).
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frequent application, confusion over the doctrine’s application abounds4 and is not
limited to deciding what cases warrant its implementation, but how strictly its letter
should be adhered to.5
Admittedly, scholarship that analyzes separation of powers issues in a state
context is lacking.6 Nonetheless, the doctrine is ripe for study in light of current
litigation trends and judicial decision-making. The goal of this Article is to provide a
basic framework from which to begin a separation of powers analysis under the Ohio
Constitution. In addition, this Article offers some insights into how a separation of
powers controversy should be dissected and suggests some directions that Ohio
courts should take in the future.
Part I of this Article presents useful background information on the separation of
powers doctrine, including its origin, its treatment in the Ohio Constitution,
predominant theories of analysis, and relevant Ohio cases. Part II (A) hypothesizes a
general approach with which to begin a separation of powers analysis. As will be
shown in Part II (B) – (D), the Ohio Supreme Court has not always conducted a
proper analysis under predominant separation of powers theories. Part III concludes
by proposing that Ohio courts initially categorize a separation of powers case as one
involving either administrative bodies, constitutionally decreed branches, or a
combination thereof. From that point, courts should ask a series of questions
associated with that particular genus of cases when deciding what method of review
to implement.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN OHIO
A. A Brief Look at Origins and Purpose
The separation of powers doctrine requires that governmental power be
constitutionally apportioned among co-ordinate branches of government—
traditionally the legislative, executive, and judicial. In America the doctrine is
considered an essential precept for civil liberty, and our federal government and
every state in the Union follow its basic tenet.7 Ohio courts, while admitting that the
Ohio Constitution contains no explicit language on the subject, have found the
doctrine to be implicit within the Constitution’s structure.8
4
See id. at 526, 715 N.E.2d at 1119 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (stating “that doctrine
[separation of powers] is not easily defined”).
5

See Bray, 89 Ohio St. 3d at 137, 729 N.E.2d at 363 (Cook, J., dissenting); Woods v. Telb,
89 Ohio St. 3d 504, 518, 733 N.E.2d 1103, 1114 (2000) (Cook, J., dissenting). Both dissents
argue for a permissive standard of review in all separation of powers cases.
6
“[A]n exploration of the academic literature indicates that, with some exceptions, leading
contemporary scholars focus their attention mainly on the work of the federal courts.” Ellen
A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81
MINN. L. REV. 1543, 1544 (1997).
7

See, e.g., WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE ANATOMY OF LIBERTY 53-54 (1963).

8

See City of South Euclid v. Jemison, 28 Ohio St. 3d 157, 158-59, 503 N.E.2d 136, 138
(1986) (“While Ohio, unlike other jurisdictions, does not have a constitutional provision
specifying the concept of separation of powers, this doctrine is implicitly embedded in the
entire framework of those sections of the Ohio Constitution that define the substance and
scope of powers granted to the three branches of state government.”).
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The celebrated Montesquieu, generally considered the father of separation of
powers thought,9 observed that an executive or legislative organ, when in possession
of both law making and law enforcing powers, is easily given to tyranny over the
governed.10 The same tyranny, Montesquieu reasoned, reveals itself when the
judiciary is annexed by another branch.11 The Founding Fathers, motivated by a
desire to preserve political liberty, adopted Montesquieu’s concept and argued for its
embodiment in the federal Constitution.12 So it came that the doctrine of separation
of powers ingrained itself in American political and legal science and, despite over
200 years of experimentation and refinement, the concept remains a firm and viable
principle of constitutional law.13
B. The Ohio Constitution—History and Structure
The constitutional history of Ohio begins with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.
The Ordinance established a government structure that favored the executive branch
or, more accurately, provided it with the means to become insufferable.14 Disdain for
an uncompromising governor resulted in the Constitutional Convention of 1802 and
the divestiture of gubernatorial power.15 The 1802 constitution placed hegemony in

9

See WILLIAM BONDY, THE SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS IN HISTORY, IN THEORY,
AND IN THE CONSTITUTIONS 13 (1967). However, the doctrine cannot be entirely attributed to
Montesquieu — and Plato, Aristotle, Polybius, Cicero, Machiavelli, Harrington, Locke, and
Blackstone are all credited with aiding in its early development. See Malcom P. Sharp, The
Classical American Doctrine of “The Separation of Powers,” 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385, 386-93
(1935).
10

See CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. 11, ch. 6 (Anne M.
Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller & Harold Samuel Stone eds. & trans., 1989) (“When legislative
power is united with executive power in a single person or in a single body of the magistracy,
there is no liberty, because one can fear that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical
laws will execute them tyrannically.”).
11
“Nor is there liberty if the power of judging is not separate from legislative power and
from executive power. If it were joined to legislative power, the power over the life and
liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge could have the force of an oppressor.”
Id.
12

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (arguing for Montesquieu’s theory of
separation of powers to be reflected in the Constitution); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton) (arguing for an independent judiciary).
13
See generally Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the
Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 175 (1990) (detailing the history of the doctrine,
recent judicial interpretations, and arguing for a greater deference to legislative and executive,
as opposed to judicial, interpretation).
14
See Frederick Woolbridge, A History of Separation of Powers in Ohio: A Study in
Administrative Law, 13 U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 199-208 (1939). For eleven years the executive
branch and the judiciary shared duties until the establishment of a legislature in 1798. Even
after the establishment of the legislature, then-governor Arthur St. Clair retained the power of
absolute veto which, in addition to his other powers, he often abused. See id. at 206-08.
15

See 3 EMILIUS O. RANDALL & DANIEL J. RYAN, HISTORY OF OHIO 115 (1912).
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the legislature, although Ohio citizens soon realized that a powerful general
assembly was no better than a powerful governor.16
The result was the Constitutional Convention of 1851, the debates of which were
peppered with criticisms of the then-dominant general assembly.17 The constitution
that followed, with amendments, remains in force.18 Although its text does not
address the issue, the structure of the Ohio Constitution requires that legislative,
executive, and judicial powers be divided among the respective branches of
government and, as an accepted corollary, that those powers be kept essentially
separate. Article II states that the “legislative power of the state shall be vested in a
general assembly.”19 Article III requires that “[t]he supreme executive power of this
state shall be vested in the governor.”20 Article IV vests judicial power “in a
supreme court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas and divisions thereof, and
such other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may from time to time be
established by law.”21
C. Separation of Powers Theories
Ohio, like other jurisdictions, has struggled to develop a workable theory with
which to analyze its separation of powers doctrine.22 The basic principle—that one
16

See Woolbridge, supra note 14, at 217 (“The governor was given a minimum of power.
The courts were to a great extent in the hands of the legislature so far as appointment, salary,
and in many cases, jurisdiction were concerned. The legislature was all powerful.”). See also
State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 462-67, 715
N.E.2d 1062, 1076-79 (1999) (detailing the results and citizen reactions under an overbearing
legislature).
17

See generally REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO (J.V. Smith, reporter 1937) [hereinafter
1851 DEBATES]. See also State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio
St. 3d at 464-66, 715 N.E.2d at 1078 (citing specific “anti-legislature” comments). It should
be noted that the 1851 convention debates centered around limiting the general assembly’s
power through checks and balances rather than a further refinement of the separation of
powers doctrine. In discussing the proposed veto power of the governor under the new
constitution, a Mr. Hitchcock of Geauga County argued, “I suppose there should be three
powers in the government, separate and distinct from each other. . . . Now sir, it does seem to
me inconsistent with our theory of government, to mix up the duties of the various
departments in the manner proposed in the proposition under consideration, and therefore I
object.” See 1 1851 DEBATES, supra, at 125. Although it would seem that granting an
executive officer the ability to influence law making by exercising a veto is contrary to
separation of powers, the principle of checks and balances operates in elegant partnership with
the doctrine to further ensure, by way of inter-branch policing, that no one governmental
faction becomes too strong. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (stating that
Montesquieu did not intend for the branches to be entirely separate, and citing numerous
examples of checks and balances in the various state constitutions).
18

See 16 OHIO JUR. 3d 154, § 4.

19

OHIO CONST. art. II, § 2.01.

20

OHIO CONST. art. III, § 3.05.

21

OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 4.01.

22

Indeed, even the federal courts have been inconsistent in their separation of powers
reasoning. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Bowsher v. Synar: Formal and Functional Approaches
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branch may not interfere with, encroach upon, or exercise powers delegated to
another branch of government23—seems simple enough, but defining those powers is
often difficult.24 The Ohio Constitution vests executive, legislative, and judicial
power in their respective branches along with other ancillary powers25 and interbranch checks.26 The ancillary powers and their concomitant checks and balances
are distinct, but often what constitutes judicial, executive, or legislative power and
when that power is being usurped is not as clear.27
Two theories dominate within this “twilight zone”28 where the constitution does
not provide a clear pronouncement. The first is formalism, generally considered to
impose bright-line limitations on governmental actors and promote predictability and
consistency through faithful interpretation of constitutional text, history, and original
understanding.29 The other is functionalism, which advocates a balancing of
to Separation-of-Powers Questions — A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488
(1987) (describing how the U.S. Supreme Court has waffled between a formalist and
functionalist approach).
23
“The legislative, executive and judicial branches of government are separate and distinct
and neither may impinge upon the authority or rights of the others; such branches are of equal
importance; and each in exercising its prerogatives and authority must have regard for the
prerogatives and authority of the others.” State ex rel. Finley v. Pfeiffer, 163 Ohio St. 149,
126 N.E.2d 57 (1955) (syllabus).
24

“The distribution of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of
the government, is, in a general sense, easily understood; but no exact rule can be laid down, a
priori, for determining, in all cases, what powers may or may not be assigned by law to each
branch.” State ex rel. Judson v. Harmon, 31 Ohio St. 250, 258 (1877).
25

An example of an ancillary power of the judicial branch is the right of the supreme court
to “appoint an administrative director who shall assist the chief justice and who shall serve at
the pleasure of the court.” OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(A)(2). This is in addition to the “judicial
power” which is vested in the courts. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 1.
26
One example of a judicial check on the executive branch is the judiciary’s sole
jurisdiction in determining the governor’s inability to execute powers of the office. See OHIO
CONST. art. III, § 22. It should again be noted that checks and balances do not efface the
separation of powers doctrine, but instead add to or condition it. See supra note 17; see also
State ex rel. Trauger v. Nash, 66 Ohio St. 612, 617-18, 64 N.E. 558, 559 (1902) (“The
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the state government are not so absolutely
distinct that an arbitrary exercise of power, or what is the same thing, an arbitrary refusal to
exercise power, could not be checked or opposed by either of the other departments. Such a
theory is opposed to the principle of checks and balances upon which the federal and state
constitutions have been framed.”).
27

“What are legislative powers, or what are executive or judicial powers is not defined or
expressed in the constitution, except in general terms. The boundry line between them is
undefined, and often difficult to determine.” State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Peters, 43 Ohio St.
629, 647, 4 N.E. 81, 85 (1885).
28

Justice Jackson aptly described separation of powers concerns that were not black or
white as being within a “zone of twilight.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
29

See generally Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels were to Govern”: The
Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 1991 DUKE L.J. 449.
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standards and policy goals to provide public actors with greater flexibility. Often a
rigid demarcation of duties will be abandoned under a functionalist approach in favor
of examining the quality of relationships between various branches of government.30
Each approach also has its own shortcomings. A formalistic approach can give
disproportionate weight to a legal factor that has little practical significance, while
functionalism can lead to extremely divergent results even among like-minded
judges.31
The most illuminating use of these theories is seen in Bowsher v. Synar.32
Bowsher involved the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
(the “Act”), which established a maximum deficit amount for fiscal years 1986
through 1991.33 Should the federal deficit exceed the amount prescribed by the Act,
the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), the Congressional
Budget Office (“CBO”), and the Comptroller General were required to initiate
spending cuts.34 Both the OMB and CBO were to submit a report detailing budget
reductions to the Comptroller General,35 and after reviewing the reports the
Comptroller General was to submit his recommendations to the President. The
President, in accordance with the Act, would then implement these recommendations
if Congress failed to remedy the budget infirmities on its own.36
The problem was that the Comptroller General was assigned an executive
function, namely the implementation of the deficit control law, while the Act
provided for the Comptroller General’s removal by a joint resolution of Congress or
impeachment.37 Although the U.S. Constitution allows the removal of an executive
officer through impeachment,38 it does not permit removal based on a joint resolution
of Congress.39 The majority, using a formal approach, found that removal by a joint
resolution permitted Congress to “remove, or threaten to remove, an officer for
executing the laws in any fashion found to be unsatisfactory to Congress.”40
Theoretically, Congress could unilaterally remove an executive officer without the
consent of the President, which was antithetical to the doctrine of separation of
powers because it allowed the legislature to control an official exercising executive
power.
30

See generally Strauss, supra note 22.

31

See Entin, supra note 13, at 212.

32

478 U.S. 714 (1986).

33

See id. at 717.

34

See id. at 718.

35

See id.

36

See id.

37

See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 720.

38

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 allows for the impeachment of U.S. officers for “Treason,
Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”
39

See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 723. The Act allowed a joint resolution of Congress to be
passed for permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, or a felony or
conduct involving moral turpitude. See id. at 728.
40

Id. at 726.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol51/iss3/10

6

2004]

SEPARATION OF POWERS IN OHIO

511

Justice White, writing in dissent, used a functional analysis when reviewing the
constitutionality of the Act. He noted that a joint resolution of Congress must not
only be approved of by both Houses, but also signed by the President.41 Should the
President feel that the Comptroller General’s removal is not required, a two-thirds
vote in each House would be required to override the presidential veto.42 Because of
the practical difficulties in passing a joint resolution, Justice White found it unlikely
that the Comptroller General would be influenced or unilaterally removed by
Congress.43 As a result, any threat to the separation of powers was wholly illusory.44
Despite their dichotomy, both formalism and functionalism are useful tools when
analyzing constitutional issues and neither should be thought to be exclusive of the
other.45 Indeed, Ohio courts have used both approaches when examining the
separation of powers.46 Two early separation of powers cases, both of which are
frequently cited authorities on the matter, express seemingly polar views as to how a
separation of powers case should be analyzed. The Ohio Supreme Court declared a
seemingly functionalist rule in City of Zanesville v. Zanesville Telephone and
Telegraph Co.,47 by stating “any encroachment by one upon the other, is a step [but
not a leap] in the direction of arbitrary power.”48 However, that same court
employed formalist language in Hale v. Ohio49 when it asserted that “the people
possessing all governmental power adopted constitutions completely distributing it to
appropriate departments.”50 Needless to say, regardless of the approach a court
chooses to take, judges should necessarily be wary of their unique role when
examining separation of powers cases in which the judiciary is an interested party.51
41

See id. at 771 (White, J., dissenting).

42

Justice White described such a situation as “a feat of bipartisanship more difficult than
that required to impeach and convict.” Id. (White, J., dissenting).
43

“The requirement of Presidential approval obviates the possibility that the Comptroller
will perceive himself as so completely at the mercy of Congress that he will function as its
tool.” Id. (White, J., dissenting).
44
“Realistic consideration of the nature of the Comptroller General’s relation to Congress
thus reveals that the threat to separation of powers conjured up by the majority is wholly
chimerical.” Id. at 774 (White, J., dissenting).
45
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships between Formalism and Functionalism in
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21 (1998) (arguing that formalism
and functionalism are both useful and can even be used simultaneously in analyzing a single
problem).
46
See Woolbridge, supra note 14, at 192 (“Often the same court will express different
views at different periods of time, or under varying factual situations.”).
47

63 Ohio St. 442, 59 N.E. 109 (1900).

48

Id. at 451, 59 N.E. at 110.

49

55 Ohio St. 210, 45 N.E. 199 (1896).

50

Id. at 214, 45 N.E. at 200.

51

See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 170 (1983) (“[T]he courts, being the final
interpretative bodies as to constitutional matters, must exercise extreme care and caution when
declaring their own powers under the constitution.”). One may question whether the judiciary,
as an interested party, is capable of making a truly impartial ruling when carving out its own
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D. Ohio Separation of Powers Examples
1. Judicial vs. Executive/Administrative
In State ex rel. Bray v. Russell,52 the Ohio Supreme Court outlawed “bad-time”
penalties as an unlawful encroachment on judicial power by the executive branch.53
The bad-time penalties, authorized by section 2967.11 of the Ohio Revised Code,
allowed parole boards to punish any crime committed by a prisoner while serving his
or her prison term by “extending the . . . term for a period of fifteen, thirty, sixty, or
ninety days.”54 The court ruled that the statute permitted the “executive branch to
prosecute an inmate for a crime, to determine whether a crime has been committed,
and to impose a sentence for that crime.”55 Since the “determination of guilt . . . and
sentencing of a defendant convicted of a crime are solely the province of the
judiciary,” the court found it necessary to negate the bad-time provision.56
In reaching its conclusion, the majority summarily rejected a functionalist
approach advanced by the state. In State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. City
of Cleveland,57 the Ohio Supreme Court stated that “the separation of powers
doctrine . . . applies only when there is some interference with another governmental
branch.”58 Plain Dealer involved a newspaper’s attempt to compel the Cleveland
mayor’s office to produce the names of candidates applying to become Cleveland’s
next chief of police.59 The Court ultimately found that the separation of powers
doctrine, as embodied in the Ohio Constitution, was inapplicable to local
governments.60 The Bray court labeled the Plain Dealer language as dicta and
asserted that the separation of powers principle was designed to protect individuals
rather than governmental branches.61 However, immediately after rejecting a rule
turf. See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and Inglorious Determinants of Judicial
Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615 (2000) (hypothesizing that judges may make decisions based
on selfish motives such as wishing to expand one’s power base but admitting that empirical
evidence for this hypothesis is lacking).
52

89 Ohio St. 3d 132, 729 N.E.2d 359 (2000).

53

See id. at 136, 729 N.E.2d at 362.

54

OHIO REV. CODE § 2967.11. This change was part of a broad overhaul in criminal
sentencing known as the “truth in sentencing” law, enacted by the Ohio General Assembly in
1996. See Anne Michaud & Kristin Delguzzi, Sentencing for Felonies Redefined, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, July 1, 1996, at A1.
55

Bray, 89 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 729 N.E.2d at 362.

56

See id. at 136, 729 N.E.2d at 362 (quoting State ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. Peters, 43 Ohio St.
629, 648, 4 N.E. 81, 86 (1885)).
57

75 Ohio St. 3d 31, 661 N.E.2d 187 (1996).

58

Id. at 38, 661 N.E.2d at 193 (citing Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 550 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Or.
1976)).
59

Id. at 32, 661 N.E.2d at 188-89.

60

Id. at 37-38, 661 N.E.2d at 192.

61

“The reason the legislative, executive, and judicial powers are separate and balanced is
to protect the people, not to protect the various branches of government.” Bray, 89 Ohio St.
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that called for an examination of branch interference, the court held that the
exclusive province of the judiciary was intruded upon.62
The dissent advocated what it termed a more “pragmatic, flexible approach.”63 It
stated that the focus should not be whether “the Parole Board’s delegated function
could be described as ‘adjudicatory’ in nature” but instead whether “the ‘bad time’
statute prevents the judicial branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions.”64 The dissent argued that the power conferred under section 2967.11 was
within the domain of administrative powers and did not interfere with judicial
functions.65
The Ohio Supreme Court visited a similar issue when it upheld the parole board’s
exercise of “post-release control.” In Woods v. Telb,66 the court affirmed the
constitutionality of section 2967.28 of the Ohio Revised Code, which allows the
parole board to send certain felons back to prison for violations of post-release
regulations.67 In distinguishing post-release control from bad-time penalties, the
court found it crucial that the post-release control statute required defendants to be
3d at 135, 729 N.E.2d at 362. This proposition is largely self-evident and does nothing to
advance the inquiry. It is without question that law and government are created for the benefit
and protection of citizens, not their institutions.
62

See id. at 136, 729 N.E.2d at 362. It would seem that the court in Bray applied the very
rule that it rejected in the beginning of its opinion. The court did not reason that the executive
branch could exercise judicial powers and at the same time not usurp the power of the judicial
branch. Such reasoning would be undeniably awkward. Furthermore, the court did not
directly analyze the rights of individuals under the “bad-time” provision to find a violation of
the separation of powers. It would seem that while the underlying principle of the separation
of powers is to protect individuals, this does not conflict with a rule that examines actions of
the co-ordinate branches to find a violation.
63
Bray, 89 Ohio St. 3d at 137, 729 N.E.2d at 363 (Cook, J., dissenting) (referring to the
approach advocated by James Madison in Federalist No. 47, the United States Supreme Court
in Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977), and the Ohio Supreme Court
in State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. City of Cleveland, 75 Ohio St. 3d 31, 661
N.E.2d 187 (1996), and State v. Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St. 3d 455, 668 N.E.2d 457 (1996)).
64

Bray, 89 Ohio St. 3d at 137, 729 N.E.2d at 363 (Cook, J., dissenting). Although under
the dissent’s reasoning the underlying objective is to determine if constitutionally assigned
judicial functions have been usurped, this can best be done by analyzing the nature of the
delegated power. Section 4.01 vests all judicial power in the various Ohio courts. OHIO
CONST. art. IV, § 4.01. If judicial power is delegated to another branch, it would prevent
courts from accomplishing their “constitutionally assigned function.” Bray, 89 Ohio St. 3d at
137, 729 N.E.2d at 363 (Cook, J., dissenting). Therefore, in order to determine if a statute is
unconstitutional, courts would be wise to determine whether the delegated function was
“judicial” in nature or “administrative.” The dissent seems to recognize this and argues that
the powers delegated under OHIO REV. CODE § 2967.11 are a permissible exercise of
administrative powers, despite the fact that those powers could be described as judicial. See
id. at 137, 729 N.E.2d at 363 (Cook, J., dissenting).
65
See Bray, 89 Ohio St. 3d at 137, 729 N.E.2d at 363 (Cook, J., dissenting) (arguing that it
is permissible for § 2967.11 to define bad-time violations as those which are crimes under the
penal code and asserting that the parole board may punish infractions of those violations).
66

89 Ohio St. 3d 504, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000).

67

OHIO REV. CODE § 2967.28.
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informed of the possibility of post-release control at his sentencing or plea hearing.68
The majority held that post-release control was imposed by the judiciary while the
executive branch merely oversaw its imposition.69 If this is the only difference
between bad-time and post-release control provisions, it raises the question of
whether bad-time penalties would be constitutional if judges informed defendants of
their possible imposition at the time of sentencing.70 Clearly, State ex rel. Bray v.
Russell and Woods v. Telb represent a strict form over function approach to the
separation of powers doctrine.
2. Judicial vs. Legislative
In September 1996, the 121st Ohio General Assembly passed a major tort reform
law known as H.B. 350.71 The tort reform measure, which was designed to impose
“a ceiling on noneconomic and punitive damage awards in lawsuits, [shorten] the
time for filing lawsuits and generally [protect] defendants in personal injury cases,”72
was signed into law in late October 1996. Even before it took effect, questions of the
law’s constitutionality abounded.73
H.B. 350 was eventually brought before the Ohio Supreme Court in State ex rel.
Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward.74 After a brief review of Ohio’s
68

“Pursuant to [Ohio Revised Code §§] 2967.28(B) and (C), a trial court must inform the
defendant at sentencing or at the time of a plea hearing that post-release control is part of the
defendant’s sentence.” Woods, 89 Ohio St. 3d at 504, 733 N.E.2d at 1104 (syllabus, ¶ 2).
69
“[Post-release control is] part of the actual sentence, unlike bad time, where a crime
committed while incarcerated resulted in an additional sentence not imposed by the court. In
other words, the court imposes the full sentence and the APA determines whether violations
merited its imposition. The defendant is fully informed at sentencing that violations of postrelease control will result in, essentially, ‘time and a half.’” Id. at 511, 733 N.E.2d at 1109.
70

The dissent in State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 89 Ohio St. 3d 132, 139, 729 N.E.2d 359,
364 (Cook, J., dissenting) raised this issue. Although not discussed by the majority, the
dissent argued that both § 2967.11(B) and § 2929.19(B)(3)(b) require the sentencing judge to
inform defendants of the possibility of bad-time penalties. Thus, reasoned the dissent, badtime penalties are part of the original judicially imposed sentence. See also Woods, 89 Ohio
St. 3d at 518, 733 N.E.2d at 1114 (Cook, J., dissenting) (contending that both bad-time and
post-release control provisions are imposed by the judicial, not executive, branch).
71
See Catherine Candisky, Tort Reform Bill Headed to Governor, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Sept. 27, 1996, at 1B.
72

See Lee Leonard, Governor Signs Tort Overhaul, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 29, 1996, at

1C.
73

Prior to the passage of H.B. 350, the Ohio Supreme Court had invalidated many tort
reform measures on state constitutional grounds. See State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial
Lawyers v. Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 457 & n.5, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1072 & n.5 (1999).
Many of those in the know predicted that portions or all of H.B. 350 would meet the same
fate. See Catherine Candisky, Tort Reform Legislation Might End Up in Court, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Sept. 5, 1996, at 1C.
74

86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999). There are many facets to this case which
provide fertile ground for law review articles. In addition to a separation of powers concern,
the court also used questionable methods in asserting jurisdiction and applying the “onesubject rule.” See James Preston Schuck, Returning the “One” to Ohio’s “One-Subject” Rule,
28 CAP. U.L. REV. 899 (2000) (discussing the “one-subject rule” as applied in Sheward); Ohio
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constitutional history,75 the majority analyzed specific provisions of the bill,
beginning with statutes of repose.76 The court stated that it had previously outlawed
certain statutes of repose and that the Legislative Service Commission had informed
the general assembly that the statutes in H.B. 350 might not pass “constitutional
muster.”77 The majority also noted that H.B. 350 contained an uncodified statement
that expressed the intent of the legislature to repeal a statute of repose in light of the
Ohio Supreme Court rulings. However, the statement added that the legislature was
determined “to respectfully disagree with those holdings and to recognize the legal
rationale set forth in the concurring-dissenting opinion.”78 With this evidence, the
court found that the general assembly had “brush[ed] aside a mandate of this court
on constitutional issues as if it were of no consequence.”79
The court used this analysis for six other components of H.B. 350.80 From its
review of these components, the court “advanced awkwardly from its scrutiny of
Supreme Court Strikes Down State General Assembly’s Tort Reform Initiative, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 804 (2000) [hereinafter Striking Down Tort Reform] (analyzing jurisdictional, separation
of powers, and “one-subject” implications of the decision). However, this Article will focus
only on the separation of powers aspect.
75
The court initially examined Ohio constitutional law prior to the present constitution of
1851. After lamenting the injustices of a pro-legislature system exemplified by the 1802-1851
era, the court concluded by stating that “the Constitution of 1851 was inspired by an antipathy
toward an all-powerful legislature,” and then proffered quotes from the 1851 constitutional
convention to illustrate this conclusion. See State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v.
Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 462-67, 715 N.E.2d at 1076-79.
76
The court began by stating basic tenets of the separation of powers doctrine. See id. at
475, 715 N.E.2d at 1085 (“‘each of the three grand divisions of the government, must be
protected from the encroachment of others’”) (quoting City of Euclid v. Jemison, 28 Ohio St.
3d 157, 159, 503 N.E.2d 136, 138 (1986)). However, the court stopped there, saying, “[I]n
light of the foregoing history, and with this principle in mind, we will proceed to examine the
several aspects of Am. Sub. H.B. No. 350.” 86 Ohio St. 3d at 475, 715 N.E.2d at 1085. This
is particularly bothersome because not only did the court ignore the presumption of
constitutionality and innocent construction rule afforded legislation, see State ex rel.
Weinberger v. Miller, 87 Ohio St. 12, 27-28, 99 N.E. 1078, 1079-80 (1912) (holding that a
statute is presumed constitutional and will not be given an unconstitutional construction if one
can be avoided), but it walked into an analysis anchored by a historical perspective which
presumed the legislature to be a nefarious and power-hungry institution.
77

See Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 476, 715 N.E.2d at 1085.

78

Id. at 476-77, 715 N.E.2d at 1086.

79

Id. at 478, 715 N.E.2d at 1087.

80

See id. at 479, 715 N.E.2d at 1087-88 (stating that certificate of merit requirements were
nullified in previous court decisions and contrary to the court-promulgated rules of civil
procedure); id. at 480-82, 715 N.E.2d at 1088-90 (finding that informing the jury of a
plaintiff’s collateral sources of recovery violates previous holdings); id. at 484, 715 N.E.2d at
1090-91 (finding that cap on punitive damages has been held invalid under the state
constitution); id. at 485-90, 715 N.E.2d at 1091-95 (holding that impositions on damage caps
contained in H.B. 350 violated previous court holdings); id. at 490-91, 715 N.E.2d at 1095-96
(stating that the legislature cannot force courts to adopt a summary judgment standard); id. at
491-92, 715 N.E.2d at 1096 (holding that the legislature cannot force courts to adopt rules of
evidence).
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seven individual provisions of H.B. 350 to declare that the reform act was
unconstitutional in its entirety.”81 The court found that the legislature had “boldly
seized the power of constitutional adjudication, appropriated the authority to
establish rules of court and overrule judicial declarations of unconstitutionality, and
. . . forbade the courts of the province of judicial review.”82 In conclusion, the
majority reasoned that H.B. 350 “usurps judicial power in violation of the Ohio
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and, therefore, is unconstitutional.”83
Chief Justice Moyer’s dissent argued that the general assembly had not usurped
the judiciary’s authority. Noting that the general assembly has the exclusive
authority to pass new laws, the dissent reasoned that even if the act was
unconstitutional it did not mean that a violation of the separation of powers had
occurred.84 Chief Justice Moyer stated that the second law, although similar to the
previous one that had been invalidated, was nevertheless a new and separate law and
was not evidence of a failure to respect a prior dictate of the court.85
II. MAKING SENSE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS IN OHIO
A. The Separation of Powers—Defining the Conflict and Method of Scrutiny
When analyzing a separation of powers controversy, framing the initial inquiry is
essential to resolving the overall problem. Our initial inquiry asks what level or
method of scrutiny to employ, and to do this we must look at the nature of the
governmental actions. First, one should ask, “Is the conflict between two
constitutional branches of government (i.e., legislative, executive, or judicial) or is it
between one of these branches and an administrative body?”86 If the conflict is
between two of the three constitutionally mandated branches of government, one
should ask, “Is the transgressor acting pursuant to legitimate authority or in spite of
it? Is there any set of circumstances under which the action could be upheld?” If the
conflict is between a constitutional branch and an administrative body ask, “Does the
action of the administrative body violate the formal rules governing its authority?”
B. Disputes Among the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches
When looking at interactions between constitutionally mandated branches it is
important to examine the action of the accused branch. At one extreme, an action
may never be permissible because its ill effect on one or both branches may be
inherent and universal under all circumstances. In this instance a strictly formal

81

Striking Down Tort Reform, supra note 74, at 804.

82

Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 492, 715 N.E.2d at 1096.

83

Id. at 494, 715 N.E.2d at 1097.

84

“Passage of such legislation is instead no more than the undertaking of a vain act: where
a court finds an act to be violative of the constitution, it is a nullity, and has been from the time
of its enactment.” Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 527, 715 N.E.2d at 1120 (Moyer, C.J.,
dissenting).
85

See id. at 528-29, 715 N.E.2d at 1120-21 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).

86

For conflicts between a constitutionally delineated branch of government and an
administrative body, see infra Part II(C).
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analysis is taken because it would be a violation of a court’s duty to fashion a
functional balance of competing interests at the cost of permanently debasing one
branch’s constitutionally apportioned power. At the other end of the spectrum, one
branch may be acting constitutionally but in the process interfere with another
branch’s prerogatives. In these cases, courts are apt to employ a functional analysis
to reach an equitable result.
Some actions may not be permissible because they will always generate a defect
in the constitutional structure of one or more branches. Such examples occur when
specific text of the constitution or a statute is violated. In State ex rel. Montgomery
v. Rogers,87 the Ohio Supreme Court found that the legislature, by requiring courts to
fix the salaries of county surveyors, had offended Article II, Section 20 of the
Constitution, which requires the general assembly to “fix the term of office and
compensation for all officers.”88 This type of separation of powers violation is
pervasive. There could be no set of circumstances in which it could be allowed, save
for an amendment of Article II, Section 20. Rightfully, the Rogers court avoided
employing a functional balancing test in light of the clear authority.
A formalist approach is also normally employed when one branch annexes a
power of another branch in an attempt to “aggrandize” itself.89 Bowsher v. Synar90 is
a notable example of this approach. In Bowsher, Congress was accused of increasing
its own power base through controlling executive actions by way of the Comptroller
General. If this charge were true, Congress would certainly not be exercising a
constitutionally assigned function because its breadth of control is limited to
legislative concerns.
The Ohio Supreme Court characterized the controversy in State ex rel. Ohio
Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward91 as an aggrandizement case. The majority
framed the question in Sheward as whether the general assembly had declared its
own legislation constitutional by issuing uncodified statements of intent and reenacting overruled legislation. Such action, the court reasoned, is an impermissible
aggrandizement of legislative power at the expense of the judiciary. As will be seen,
the Ohio Supreme Court’s characterization of the Sheward case is highly suspect.
On the other extreme of separation of powers cases are interference cases, which
normally demand a functionalist analysis. These cases occur when one branch is
exercising a constitutionally assigned function but, while doing so, happens to
interfere with a co-ordinate branch.92 In these instances, the United States Supreme

87

71 Ohio St. 203, 73 N.E. 461 (1905).

88

OHIO CONST. art. II, § 20.

89

The rule that one branch may not annex or increase its power at the expense of another
branch is also commonly referred to as the “anti-aggrandizement” principle. See Neil
Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization, and Globalization: Separation of Powers Limits on
Congressional Authority to Assign Federal Power to Non-Federal Actors, 50 RUTGERS L. REV.
331, 345-348 (1998).
90

478 U.S. 714 (1986). See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.

91

86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999).

92

See Alan B. Morrison, A Non-Power Look at Separation of Powers, 79 GEO. L.J. 281
(1990) (“Even when there has been no textual violation and one branch has not exercised
power given by the Constitution to another, separation of powers problems may still exist if a
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Court has adopted a more lenient standard of examination that focuses on whether or
not a “core” function has been interfered with.93 The Ohio Supreme Court, when
ruling on cases of interference, employs a functional balancing of interests as well.94
This balancing approach is best exemplified by the “power of the purse” cases,95
wherein the Ohio Supreme Court has adopted a scheme that places the burden of
disproving the reasonableness of a court’s budget request on the challenger, which is
normally the legislative body dispensing the court’s annual funding.96 Thus, the
courts are insulated from what could otherwise be a coercive influence when the
legislature carries out its constitutionally assigned duty of appropriating funds.
The Ohio Supreme Court has also required a strong showing of interference
when the legislature enacts a law that, although constitutionally permissible, could
impair the judiciary. In State v. Pachay,97 the court stated that the Ohio General
Assembly had the constitutional power to enact “speedy trial statutes” which set
definitive guidelines for enforcing a defendant’s constitutional right to a prompt
trial.98 The court also recognized that with increasing caseloads such statutes had the
potential to interfere with court business.99 However, the present caseload and

statute ‘disrupts the proper balance between coordinate branches.’”) (quoting Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
93
See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (stating that
courts must determine “the extent to which [the statute] prevents the . . . [b]ranch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions,” and then “determine whether that
impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional
authority of Congress”).
94

But note that the looser standard applied to cases of interference is not the standard used
for all separation of powers cases. Compare Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433
U.S. 425 (1977) (employing a more functional approach in an interference case) with Bowsher
v. Synar 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (using a stricter, less flexible standard for an encroachment
case). Some Ohio Supreme Court justices have called for a blanket use of the Nixon style
analysis. See State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 89 Ohio St. 3d 132, 137, 729 N.E.2d 359, 363
(2000) (Cook, J., dissenting) (arguing for a flexible and pragmatic approach as applied in
Nixon). However, the U.S. Supreme Court does not universally apply this low level of
scrutiny.
95
The potential for undue influence by the entity that “pays the bills” is well taken. James
Madison wrote, “[A]s the legislative department alone has access to the pockets of the people,
and has in some constitutions full discretion, and in all a prevailing influence, over the
pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other departments, a dependence is thus created in the
latter, which gives still greater facility to encroachments of the former.” THE FEDERALIST NO.
48, at 278 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
96

Judicial budget requests are presumed to be reasonable and it is the burden of the
appropriator to prove otherwise. See, e.g., State ex rel. Johnston v. Taulbee, 66 Ohio St. 2d
417, 423 N.E.2d 80 (1981); State ex rel. Edwards v. Murray, 48 Ohio St. 2d 303, 358 N.E.2d
577 (1976); State ex rel. Giuliani v. Perk, 14 Ohio St. 2d 235, 237 N.E.2d 397 (1968).
97

64 Ohio St. 2d 218, 416 N.E.2d 589 (1980).

98

See id. (syllabus).

99

See id. at 221, 416 N.E.2d at 591.
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resulting interference was not so great as to warrant the statute’s invalidation on
separation of powers grounds.100
A functional balancing test is also seen when the constitutionally permissible
actions of the executive branch somehow interfere with the business of the courts. In
State ex rel. Gilligan v. Hoddinott,101 a lower state court issued an order preventing
anyone from interfering with plaintiff Ohio Inns’ performance of contractual
obligations, which consisted of operating and managing facilities in Ohio state
parks.102 When an unrelated Ohio Inns labor dispute turned violent, the Governor
had the parks closed and effectively violated the lower court order.103 The Ohio
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionally permissible actions of the Governor, even
though they interfered with the court order, and in doing so the court applied a
functional balancing test between public safety and contract rights.104
C. The Administrative Conundrum—A Fourth Branch of Government?
Roosevelt’s New Deal and the complexities of effective government in the
modern age have given rise to something that Montesquieu and the Founding Fathers
apparently never contemplated—the Administrative State. In a strictly theoretical
sense, the exercise of administrative power cannot function in a tripartite government
because “what may be denominated as such must fall within one of the three great
powers recognized by the constitution, namely, executive, legislative, or judicial.”105
The observations of Justice Jackson are particularly illuminating on this subject:
[Administrative bodies] have become a veritable fourth branch of the
government, which has deranged our three-dimensional thinking. Courts
have differed in assigning a place to the seemingly necessary bodies of
our constitutional system. Administrative agencies have been called
quasi-legislative, quasi-executive, or quasi-judicial, as the occasion
required, in order to validate their functions within the separation-ofpowers scheme of the Constitution. The mere retreat to the qualifying
“quasi” is implicit with the confession that all recognized classifications
have broken down, and “quasi” is a smooth cover which we draw over our
confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed.106
In any event, actions of administrative agencies are best reviewed under a
functional rather than a formal approach, if for no other reason than trying to
compartmentalize every administrative action into a legislative, executive, or judicial

100

See id. at 222-23, 416 N.E.2d at 592.

101

36 Ohio St. 2d 127, 304 N.E.2d 382 (1973).

102

Id. at 128, 304 N.E.2d at 383.

103

Id. at 129, 304 N.E.2d at 383.

104

“[The] Governor’s exercise of discretion was aimed at protecting state citizens and state
property from harm. That interest far outweighs the interest which Ohio Inns has in protecting
its contract rights.” Id. at 132, 304 N.E.2d at 385.
105

2 OHIO JUR. 3d § 10 (1985).

106

FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2004

15

520

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:505

subset is a futile exercise.107 However, it is the imposition of a set of formal rules,
such as legislative supervision and judicial review, that aids us in our analysis of the
relationships between agencies and constitutionally defined branches and helps to
guard against tyranny.108 For instance, the general assembly may not delegate
legislative power to an administrative agency,109 and agencies exercising quasijudicial functions can have their rulings appealed to an Article IV state court to
guarantee due process even where the agency’s enabling legislation does not provide
for review.110
A cardinal example of the relationship between the judiciary and administrative
agencies is City of South Euclid v. Jemison.111 Under section 4509.101(B) of the
Ohio Revised Code, a court was required to impose punishment on individuals who
were found guilty of traffic offenses and could not provide proof of insurance.112
However, after the court had determined that a defendant had committed a traffic
offense and was not financially responsible, the defendant was allowed to appeal the
conviction to the registrar of motor vehicles.113 The registrar was permitted to
overturn the court’s decision if it felt that the defendant was not guilty of driving
without insurance.114

107

In fact, it has been observed that since “a typical administrative agency exercises many
types of power, including executive, legislative, and judicial power, a strict application of the
theory of separation of powers would make the very existence of such an agency
unconstitutional.” KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.09, at 65
(1958).
108

“The protection against tyranny comes, not from separating the powers, but from our
system of legislative supervision of administrative action and from our system of judicial
review of administrative action.” KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 23
(1959).
109

See State ex rel. Foster v. Evatt, 144 Ohio St. 65, 56 N.E.2d 265 (1944). This principle
is commonly referred to as the “non-delegation” doctrine. See Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution,
Privitization, and Globalization: Separation of Powers Limits on Congressional Authority to
Assign Federal Power to Non-Federal Actors, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 331, 358-364 (1998).
110

See State ex rel. Tyler v. McMonagle, 25 Ohio St. 3d 13, 494 N.E.2d 1144 (1986).

111

28 Ohio St. 3d 157, 503 N.E.2d 136 (1986).

112

See OHIO REV. CODE § 4509.101(B).

113

OHIO REV. CODE § 4509.101(B)(3)(a) requires the registrar to notify the defendant, post
conviction, that he has an opportunity to contest the court’s finding. The defendant was
allowed to “submit a statement . . . that he did not operate or permit operation of the motor
vehicle at the time of the offense.” The registrar was then permitted to “make an investigation
to determine . . . whether there is a reasonable basis for believing that the person has operated
or permitted the operation of the motor vehicle at the time of the traffic offense without the
operation being covered by proof of financial responsibility. If the registrar determines that
such a reasonable basis exists, the registrar shall afford the person an opportunity for hearing...
to determine whether the person has violated . . . this section.” Id.
114

OHIO REV. CODE § 4509.101(D) provides: “Any order of suspension or impoundment
issued under this section . . . may be terminated if the registrar determines upon a showing of
proof of financial responsibility that the operator . . . was in compliance with division (A)(1)
of this section.”
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The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that this scheme violated the separation of
powers on two levels. First, even if a court determined that the defendant had
“operated or permitted the operation of a motor vehicle without appropriate financial
responsibility at the time of the traffic offense,” the registrar of motor vehicles was
allowed to review this finding and grant the defendant an opportunity for a
hearing.115 Secondly, the court found that allowing the registrar to reverse a judicial
determination was equally antithetical to the doctrine of separation of powers
because it wrongly conferred “appellate jurisdiction upon an administrative agent or
agency from a decision rendered by an Ohio court.”116
Thus, even if one accepts the notion that administrative agencies are in reality a
“fourth” branch of government,117 it is a branch that is kept intentionally subservient
to its constitutionally derived counterparts. Although an administrative agency may
promulgate rules, it cannot enact legislation, and the legislature has the right to
redefine an agency’s structure and objectives.118 An agency’s decisions are
reviewable in court, but that same agency may neither review a court’s ruling119 nor
limit the inherent powers of the judiciary.120 In the end, it would seem that while
administrative agencies may defy the definition of separation of powers, they serve
its underlying purpose in two respects: Their expertise in a given area promotes
efficiency, and their powers, although blended, are kept in check so as to avoid
tyranny.
D. Analyzing the Roles and Actions of Government Actors
1. Executive/Administrative Actions—State ex rel. Bray v. Russell
and Woods v. Telb
In cases involving agencies, the defendant will often be cast in a dual role of
administrative body and executive branch organ. In such instances, the agency must

115
The court made this observation in reference to § 4509.101(B)(3)(a) and noted that the
registrar not only has the power to accept a statement of the defendant contesting the court’s
finding but also to grant the defendant a hearing on the merits of his complaint. See City of
South Euclid v. Jemison, 28 Ohio St. 3d 157, 162, 503 N.E.2d 136, 140 (1986).
116
See id. at 162, 503 N.E.2d at 140 (quoting State ex rel. Shafer v. Otter, 106 Ohio St.
415, 140 N.E. 399 (1922)).
117

The President’s Committee on Administrative Management reported in 1937 that
administrative bodies constituted a “headless ‘fourth branch’ of Government.” PRESIDENT’S
COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 39
(1937).
118

See State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Voinovich, 69 Ohio St. 3d 225, 239, 631 N.E.2d
582, 593 (1994) (stating that the General Assembly may restructure an agency once they have
created it).
119

See City of South Euclid v. Jemison, 28 Ohio St. 3d 157, 503 N.E.2d 136 (1986).

120

See State v. Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St. 3d 455, 668 N.E.2d 457 (1996) (holding that an
administrative action cannot limit inherent judicial powers, in this case the granting of a stay);
State v. Warner, 55 Ohio St. 3d 31, 45, 564 N.E.2d 18, 32 (1990) (finding that the issuing of
subpoenas is a ministerial as opposed to inherient judicial function and a non-judicial officer
may grant them without violating the separation of powers).
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satisfy the separation of powers doctrine on two levels. With respect to an agency’s
administrative status we ask, “Does the action of the administrative body violate the
formal rules governing its authority?” With respect to the agency’s executive branch
status we ask, “Is the transgressor acting pursuant to any legitimate authority or in
spite of it? Is there any set of circumstances under which the action could be
upheld?”
The language of State ex rel. Bray v. Russell121 can create the illusion that
divergent conclusions will be reached depending on the method of analysis
employed. The basic question is whether or not the executive branch, by way of an
administrative agency, may impose punishment on a prisoner outside the scope of a
judicially imposed sentence. The clear answer is no. While it is accepted in Ohio
that the executive branch is empowered to carry out a sentence after it is imposed,122
the sentencing itself is a judicial function.123
However, even under a functionalist analysis it is not clear that the result would
be any different. The Bray dissent advocated an approach that would find a
separation of powers violation only if one branch prevented another from carrying
out its constitutionally assigned functions.124 Although it is not always clear what
amounts to a constitutionally assigned function,125 it seems undeniable that the
determination of guilt and sentencing of criminals is a function of the judiciary.
The functionalist argument in Bray does gain momentum when analyzed in
conjunction with Woods v. Telb.126 Woods, which was decided shortly after Bray,
upheld a statute allowing the parole board to implement post-release control because
it was part of the prisoner’s original sentence.127 This raises the question of whether,
had the trial court simply informed the prisoner during sentencing that he could be
subjected to bad-time penalties imposed by the parole board, the statute would have
been constitutional. If so, it seems contrary to notions of expediency and efficiency

121

89 Ohio St. 3d 132, 729 N.E.2d 359 (2000).

122

“[H]aving decided and the decision having become final — the judicial function ceased
in that case. The case was no longer pending. The enforcement of the judgment was no part
of the judicial function. That duty devolved upon the executive department and the duty was
ministerial and not judicial in its nature.” Long & Allstatter Co. v. Willis, 52 Ohio App. 299,
302-03, 3 N.E.2d 910, 912 (1935).
123
See State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 89 Ohio St. 3d 132, 136, 729 N.E.2d 359, 362 (2000)
(“The determination of guilt in a criminal matter and the sentencing of a defendant convicted
of a crime are solely the province of the judiciary.”).
124

See id. at 137, 729 N.E.2d at 363 (Cook, J., dissenting).

125

See State v. Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St. 3d 455, 668 N.E.2d 457 (1996). The court split
5-2 on whether or not the ability to grant a judicial stay is an “inherent” court function.
126

89 Ohio St. 3d 504, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000).

127

“Those terms [post-release control] are part of the actual sentence, unlike bad-time,
where a crime committed while incarcerated resulted in an additional sentence not imposed by
the court. In other words, the court imposes the full sentence and the APA determines whether
violations merited its imposition. The defendant is fully informed at sentencing that violations
of post-release control will result in, essentially, ‘time and a half.’” Id. at 511, 733 N.E.2d at
1109.
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to hold that the executive usurped the judiciary’s role because the trial court did not
explicitly state that bad-time was included with the original sentence.
The court may have refused to apply a relaxed standard of review because the
issue closely revolved around a defendant’s constitutional right to due process. The
Court of Appeals for Trumbull County in White v. Konteh128 found the bad-time
provision to be unconstitutional because it allowed an inmate to be tried and
imprisoned by someone other than a “neutral magistrate.”129 This due process
concern, although not expressly addressed by the Bray court, may have influenced
the court’s opinion and triggered a stricter scrutiny.130 Even so, finding that the
judiciary implicitly sentenced defendants to bad-time provisions simply to effect an
efficient result may lead the court onto a slippery slope that it wisely avoided.131
What is troubling about the court’s decision is its apparent failure to enforce a
duty of the trial court and instead shifting the blame to the executive branch. The
Bray court held that bad-time provisions were not part of the original sentence, but
distinguished and upheld the statute in Woods on the basis that it required the trial
court to inform the defendant during sentencing of post-release control.132 But as the
dissent in Bray noted, judges were required by statute to inform defendants of the
possibility of bad-time penalties at the sentencing hearing and prior to accepting a
defendant’s plea.133 Accordingly, there is no meaningful distinction between the
requirements for defendant notification in the statutes at issue in Bray and in Woods.
When this fact is taken into account, our initial questions are answered in favor of
the parole board. The administrative agency is acting within the formal rules
governing its authority. Additionally, the executive branch is carrying out its
constitutionally assigned function of executing a judicially imposed sentence.
The difference appears in the actual notification, which was given in Woods but
apparently not in Bray.134 Although it is impermissible for the executive to impose

128

No. 99-T-0020, 1999 WL 587976 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1999).

129

“[I]t should also follow that such a person should not be subjected to additional
incarceration for a new offense unless he has been tried before a neutral magistrate.” Id. at *5.
130

The court seemed to be unusually concerned with the rights of individuals rather than
simply limiting the discussion to the roles and duties of the various branches of government.
See Bray, 89 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 729 N.E.2d at 362 (stating that the principle of separation of
powers was designed to protect people, not branches of government). This type of reasoning
is conspicuously absent in most separation of powers cases.
131

See generally Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985).

132
Compare Bray, 89 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 729 N.E.2d at 362 (finding that the bad-time
penalty is an entirely separate punishment from the original sentence) with Woods, 89 Ohio St.
3d at 513, 733 N.E.2d at 1110 (“Further, we hold that pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(B) and (C), a
trial court must inform the defendant at sentencing or at the time of a plea hearing that postrelease control is part of the defendant’s sentence.”).
133

See Bray, 89 Ohio St. 3d at 138-39, 729 N.E.2d at 364 (Cook, J., dissenting) (noting
that OHIO REV. CODE § 2967.11(B) implements bad-time provisions as part of the originally
imposed sentence and that § 2929.19(B)(3)(b) and § 2943.032 require a trial judge to inform
defendants of the possibility of bad-time penalties prior to sentencing).
134
“Because the record clearly indicates that the defendant was advised of discretionary
post-release control both in his signed plea form and in his sentencing entry, we find no
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punishment not included in the judiciary’s sentence, the omission of the express
inclusion of the bad-time provision seems to be an oversight of the trial court. By
overruling the statute rather than acknowledging a failure within its own branch, the
Bray court has arguably committed its own separation of powers breach.
2. Legislative Actions—State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward
The analysis employed in State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v.
Sheward135 is a paradigm that should almost never be applied, and Ohio courts would
be wise to abandon the approach lest it become a fashionable way to illustrate a
separation of powers violation. It should be noted that other aspects of the Sheward
decision have generated controversy in both the popular media and academia,136 but
those issues are not addressed in this Article.137 Focusing strictly on a separation of
powers violation, this Article argues that the Sheward opinion cannot be maintained
under either a formal or functional analysis.
Sheward involved a conflict between two constitutional branches of government.
Therefore, we begin with the question appropriate for such cases: “Is the transgressor
acting pursuant to any legitimate authority or in spite of it? Is there any set of
circumstances under which the action could be upheld?” The majority opinion held
that H.B. 350 “intrudes upon judicial power by declaring itself constitutional, by
reenacting legislation struck down as unconstitutional, and by interfering with this
court’s power to regulate court procedure.”138 Each of these contentions will be
analyzed in turn.
a. Statements of Intent
The Sheward court found certain uncodified statements of intent and legislative
findings within H.B. 350 to be particularly egregious and demonstrative of
legislative intent to usurp judicial power.139 The court interpreted these statements as
legislative declarations of constitutionality,140 which is something only the judiciary
violation of the separation of powers doctrine in this case.” Woods, 89 Ohio St. 3d at 513, 733
N.E.2d at 1110.
135

86 Ohio St. 3d 451, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999).

136

See, e.g., Basil Loeb, Abuse of Power: Disregarding Traditional Legal Principles to
Invalidate Tort Reform, 67 DEF. COUNS. J. 501 (2000); supra note 74.
137

See supra note 74.

138

Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 462, 715 N.E.2d at 1076.

139

See id. at 459-61 n.7, 715 N.E.2d at 1073-75 n.7 (listing several offensive sections of
the bill) (“[T]he bill includes a number of uncodified sections that contain various findings and
statements of intent with regard to the constitutionality of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350 and some of
its more controversial provisions. [W]e will examine the substance of these declarations, as
well as the extent to which they reveal an attempt to absorb the authority of the judicial branch
of government.”). See also H.B. 350, § 5, 121st Gen. Ass., 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1996)
(detailing legislative findings and statements of intent).
140

See Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 478, 715 N.E.2d at 1086 (finding that the General
Assembly, with regard to statutes of repose, had stated an intent to brush “aside a mandate of
this court on constitutional issues as if it were of no consequence”); id. at 479, 715 N.E.2d at
1087 (holding that a legislative finding which declares statements of merit to be a substantive,
rather than procedural, requirement is not binding on the judiciary); id. at 490, 715 N.E.2d at
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may do.141 Therefore, the majority reasoned, the legislature had invaded the
exclusive province of the courts.142
Chief Justice Moyer’s dissent acknowledged the majority’s position, but found
the legislative statements to be no more than an expression of disagreement with the
court’s prior decisions.143 Furthermore, the dissent argued that the majority had
confused legislative with judicial findings and asserted that the commentary included
in H.B. 350 could be construed as a simple statement of public policy.144
This divergence of conclusions as to the meaning of the legislative statements is
particularly bothersome because the court failed to address standard rules of statutory
interpretation. In Ohio, legislative enactments are not only presumed to be
constitutional,145 but they are given a constitutional construction if one is available.146
The majority felt comfortable in dismissing the Chief Justice’s interpretation by
reasoning that if the substantive law of H.B. 350 invaded the sanctuary of the
judiciary by reenacting unconstitutional legislation, it was likely that the uncodified
statements of H.B. 350 harbored an unlawful intent as well.147 Although the court
may have applied the “innocent construction rule” silently and still found the
questionable sections unconstitutional “beyond a reasonable doubt,”148 it is entirely

1094-95 (stating that legislative findings and statements of intent as to the constitutionality of
limits on general damages invade the judicial province); id. at 491, 715 N.E.2d at 1095 (ruling
that the legislature may not intend to establish a judicial procedural rule such as the standard
for summary judgment).
141

See, e.g., Beagle v. Walden, 78 Ohio St. 3d 59, 62, 676 N.E.2d 506, 508 (1997)
(“[I]nterpretation of the state and federal Constitutions is a role exclusive to the judicial
branch.”).
142

“The General Assembly has [attempted] to establish itself as the final arbiter of the
validity of its own legislation. It has boldly seized the power of constitutional adjudication.”
Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 492, 715 N.E.2d at 1096.
143
“Judicial power is no more infringed by the General Assembly’s statements of intent
than by the expression of disagreement with our rulings by a legislator in debate over
proposed legislation, or in a newspaper editorial. The majority’s indignation with the General
Assembly’s expressions of disagreement with prior decisions of this court appears founded on
mere pique.” Id. at 529, 715 N.E.2d at 1121 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). See also Jonathan L.
Entin, Supreme Court Not Out of Line on Tort Reform Ruling, CRAIN’S CLEVELAND BUSINESS,
Aug. 30, 1999, at 11 (stating that the General Assembly may have been trying to generate a
dialogue with the supreme court).
144

See Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 529-30, 715 N.E.2d at 1121.

145

See State v. Hochhausler, 76 Ohio St. 3d 455, 458, 668 N.E.2d 457, 462 (1996).

146

See State ex rel. Steffen v. Kraft, 67 Ohio St. 3d 439, 440, 619 N.E.2d 688, 689 (1993).

147

See Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 505-06, 715 N.E.2d at 1105-06.

148

State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 164 Ohio St. 142, 128 N.E.2d 59 (1955)
(syllabus ¶ 1) (“An enactment of the General Assembly is presumed to be constitutional, and
before a court may declare it unconstitutional it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that
the legislation and constitutional provisions are clearly incompatible.”).
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unclear why the offending portions could not have been severed from the remainder
of the bill as is required under Ohio law.149
Any legislative provision (other than a constitutional amendment) that purports to
declare a law constitutional or brazenly rejects a prior constitutional ruling is an
indignity to the separation of powers doctrine. However, such a provision is easily
severable from the legislation and should not be thought to infect, by reason of its
offensiveness, the remainder of the law. To illustrate, imagine that the Governor of
Ohio calls a press conference and announces that he intends to exercise an absolute
veto. The governor may not exercise an absolute veto and to do so would
undoubtedly infringe on the general assembly’s constitutional power. Should his
stated intent be ignored and his veto given the constitutional weight it deserves or
would the entire act be considered ultra vires? What if the veto had all the trappings
of a constitutional act and even the most sophisticated observer could not detect fault
with the deed but for the Governor’s stated intent? What if the Governor did not
proclaim his intent, but held it in his heart as he signed the order? Would an
unconstitutional intent nullify an otherwise legal act?
In all practical respects, enforcing the veto to its lawful extent would not promote
tyranny or interfere with the legislature’s constitutionally assigned functions. To
deny the veto would in itself present a separation of powers quandary. The
separation of powers doctrine would prevent an absolute veto intention from
metamorphosing into an unconstitutional act, but it is the act that concerns us. A
branch cannot aggrandize itself, intrude upon, or interfere with another branch
through intent, but only through an overt act. Since the act is so easily divorced from
the intention, the illegitimacy of the latter should not preclude the former.150
b. Legislative Reenactment
Laws which are mirror images of legislation previously struck down could
conceivably offend the separation of powers doctrine, but courts should abstain from
analyzing such situations under a separation of powers theory. To do so does not
advance understanding of law, because in virtually all cases separation of powers is
not the primary offense. Indeed, only after a thorough examination of the underlying
offense will a separation of powers violation actually reveal itself, after which the
separation of powers issue becomes peripheral.
In its opinion, the Sheward court stated that the general assembly had reenacted
legislation that the court previously found unconstitutional, thus violating the
separation of powers. This, the Sheward majority reasoned, begins when the
legislature initially enacts law A, which the court later finds unconstitutional because
149
“‘[A] statute may be invalid in part, by reason of some provisions being repugnant to
the state Constitution, and valid as to the residue, where it appears that the invalid part is an
independent provision, not in its nature and connection essential to the other parts of the
statute, nor so related to the general purpose of the enactment as to warrant the conclusion that
the Legislature would have refused to adopt it with the invalid part stricken out.’” State ex rel.
Greenward Realty Co. v. Zangerle, 135 Ohio St. 533, 540, 21 N.E.2d 662, 666 (1939) (quoting
Gager v. Prout, 48 Ohio St. 89, 108, 26 N.E. 1013, 1016 (1891)). The legislature has also
expressed its will that this rule be the law of Ohio. See OHIO REV. CODE § 1.50.
150
This is not to say that an unconstitutional intention should not serve as evidence of an
unconstitutional act. A suspect intention should naturally raise a “red flag” in the mind of the
judge as to the legality of the underlying act.
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it offends a provision of the Ohio Constitution. The legislature then passes a similar
law B, which the court finds to be essentially a reenactment of law A.151 Because the
legislature had reenacted a law which was previously found unconstitutional, the
legislature had ignored the dictates of the supreme court, something which the
separation of powers doctrine would not allow.152
The dissenting Chief Justice argued that the legislature had the constitutional
right to pass a separate, though similar, statute as long as it has not ignored a direct
order of the court.153 If the second law does contravene the constitution, it is a
“nullity” from its inception and can never have the capability to violate the doctrine
of separation of powers.154 The Chief Justice insisted that the legislature will always
have the power to pass law B, even if it is unconstitutional.155 However, should the
law offend the constitution it will be overruled by the higher law, in this case the
constitution as interpreted in opinion A. Since law B is a nullity from the beginning,

151

This is exactly the phenomenon described by the Sheward court. See Sheward, 86 Ohio
St. 3d at 462, 715 N.E.2d at 1076 (“Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350 intrudes upon judicial power . . . by
reenacting legislation stuck down as unconstitutional. . . .”). See also id. at 476-78, 715
N.E.2d at 1085-87 (finding that H.B. 350 reenacts statutes of repose that were declared
unconstitutional in Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 70 Ohio St. 3d 460, 639 N.E.2d 425 (1994)); id.
at 479-82, 715 N.E.2d at 1088-90 (holding that H.B. 350’s requirements for jury award
reduction in light of collateral benefits are not materially different from legislation overruled
in Pryor v. Webber, 23 Ohio St. 2d 104, 263 N.E.2d 235 (1970) and Sorrell v. Thevenir, 69
Ohio St. 3d 415, 633 N.E.2d 504 (1994)); id. at 483-85, 715 N.E.2d at 1090-91 (ruling H.B.
350’s limits on punitive damages to be essentially the same legislation outlawed in Zoppo v.
Homestead Ins. Co., 71 Ohio St. 3d 552, 644 N.E.2d 397 (1994) and Williams v. Aetna Fin.
Co., 83 Ohio St. 3d 464, 700 N.E.2d 859 (1998)); id. at 485-90, 715 N.E.2d at 1091-95
(finding the provisions for general damage limitations reenacted in H.B. 350 to be similar to
those struck down in Morris v. Savoy, 61 Ohio St. 3d 684, 576 N.E.2d 765 (1991)).
152
The majority reasoned that in reenacting legislation that was previously held
unconstitutional, the General Assembly was in effect ignoring or, at best, sidestepping a
binding ruling of the court. See Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 505-06, 715 N.E.2d at 1105.
153

Ignoring a direct order of the court, the Chief Justice reasoned, can only happen if the
first statute is enforced despite the existence of a court opinion declaring it unlawful. See id.
at 528, 715 N.E.2d at 1120 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (“Adoption of a statute similar to one
already struck down does not contradict a prior judgment of this court invalidating the first
statute. The fact remains that two separate statutes are involved, passed in different sessions
of the General Assembly, by different legislators, and having different effective dates.”).
154

“[T]he General Assembly [cannot] usurp judicial power by the act of adopting
unconstitutional statutes. Passage of such legislation is instead no more than the undertaking
of a vain act: where the court finds an act to be vocative of the constitution, it is a nullity, and
has been from the time of its enactment.” Id. at 527, 715 N.E.2d at 1120 (Moyer, C.J.,
dissenting). See also Striking Down Tort Reform, supra note 74, at 806 (“[T]he Chief Justice
argued from his own lexicon that to the extent that the General Assembly reenacted statutes
already deemed unconstitutional . . . such reenactment did not usurp judicial power; rather,
such action is non-action, ‘a nullity’ in constitutional terms.”).
155

“Although it is desirable that a legislature make a good-faith effort to enact law that is
constitutional, the General Assembly has the right to enact legislation even if the
constitutionality of that legislation is questionable.” Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 528, 715
N.E.2d at 1120 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
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it can never usurp the power of the judiciary. Therefore its eradication is based on
the underlying infirmity, not because of separation of powers.
These two opinions offer contrasting answers to our initial question. The
majority concluded that the legislature did not act pursuant to constitutional authority
and that there is no set of circumstances wherein its actions could be upheld. In such
cases, a formal approach such as the one advanced in State ex rel. Bray v. Russell156
and State ex rel. Montgomery v. Rogers157 is normally used. The dissent reasoned
that the legislature’s actions were within its constitutionally ascribed power. Under
this conclusion, any interference with another branch’s duties should be judged
according to a functional test as employed in State v. Pachay158 and State ex rel.
Gilligan v. Hoddinott.159
A formal analysis would arguably agree with Chief Justice Moyer. It is hard to
see how the power of the judiciary is undermined, especially when it retains the
power to declare legislative acts invalid. Also, by reason of its nonexistence, law B
could not be before the court when law A was disputed and held unconstitutional.
Technically the court decides only the matter before it, and although it may be
wasteful to fashion law virtually identical to that which was held unconstitutional,
the legislative act does not violate the doctrine of separation of powers because, in
the most formal sense, it is not the same law.160 Although it doesn’t seem necessary
for the second law to be “nullified” at the outset in order to prevent a usurpation of
judicial power, whether it was in fact nullified is an ongoing question.161
From a functionalist point of view, the majority’s argument is strengthened but
still not convincing. It is conceivable that repeated reenactments of substantially
similar legislation, even if the general assembly had the constitutional right to do so,
could be the practical equivalent of refusing to enforce the supreme court’s edict. In
such a case both branches are exercising a constitutionally permissible power, but
one happens to be interfering with the objectives of another. This would be less so if
the disputed law centered around a generally debatable point rather than a clear

156

89 Ohio St. 3d 132, 729 N.E.2d 359 (2000).

157

71 Ohio St. 203, 73 N.E. 461 (1905).

158

64 Ohio St. 2d 218, 416 N.E.2d 589 (1980).

159

36 Ohio St. 2d 127, 304 N.E.2d 382 (1973).

160

“We [the judiciary] cannot intervene in the process of legislation and enjoin the
proceedings of the legislative department of the state. That department is free to act upon its
own judgment of its constitutional powers. We have not even advisory jurisdiction to render
opinions upon mooted questions about constitutional limitations of the legislative function,
and we will not presume to control the exercise of that function of government by the General
Assembly, much less by the people, in whom all the power abides. The Legislature, having
delegated authority, prescribed and limited by the Constitution, may exceed its authority by
promulgating a law in conflict with the Constitution.” Pfeifer v. Graves, 88 Ohio St. 473, 48788, 104 N.E. 529, 533 (1913).
161

From a formal analysis, judicial power remains intact either way. Although a legal
rationalist would insist that the law was nullified from its inception, a legal realist would argue
that the law was valid until a court declared otherwise. See generally WILFRID E. RUMBLE,
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968).
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constitutional impossibility,162 or was a short-lived experiment rather than an
absurdly protracted legislative effort.163 Whether H.B. 350 was either of these is not
entirely clear.164
But these observations mask a more basic point. In order for a reenacted law to
violate the separation of powers doctrine, it must also suffer from the same
constitutional defect as the original law. Otherwise, it would not be in conflict with
the court’s constitutional interpretation as rendered in the original opinion. To say
merely that the “General Assembly has circumvented our mandates”165 is not
enough. The original mandates must be reiterated, clarified, and elaborated to
advance an understanding of the law.166 Whether or not a separation of powers
violation is present is a side issue.167
c. Regulating Court Procedure
An undeniable separation of powers violation of H.B. 350 was the general
assembly’s attempts to regulate court procedure. The Ohio Constitution provides
that rules governing court practice and procedure are to be adopted by the Ohio
Supreme Court.168 Several provisions of H.B. 350 attempted to impose procedural

162

See Entin, supra note 143, at 11 (stating that the “decisions this law [H.B. 350] was
designed to overturn presented genuinely close legal questions”).
163

See generally Stephen J. Werber, Ohio Tort Reform Versus the Ohio Constitution, 69
TEMPLE L. REV. 1155 (1996) (detailing the recent history of tort reform efforts in Ohio).
164
The majority uses especially strong language when describing the legislature’s
behavior, stating: “[E]ach [branch] has endeavored to comport with the principle of separation
of powers and respect the integrity and independence of the other, that is, until now.”
Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 457-58, 715 N.E.2d at 1072-73. However, when analyzing various
provisions of H.B. 350, the majority almost always discusses only one previously enacted law
pertaining to the same subject. Nor is it apparent, given the 4-3 split in the opinion, that the
court was dealing with clear cut issues.
165

Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 492, 715 N.E.2d at 1096.

166

The majority does examine the underlying issues for some of the provisions of H.B.
350, but used almost half of the opinion detailing the constitutional history of Ohio in an
attempt to buttress its separation of powers claim. This almost assuredly compromised the
court’s analysis of the underlying constitutional infirmities of H.B. 350 which, considering
that the analysis of a 156-page bill occupies only 11 pages of the North Eastern Reporter,
appears somewhat anemic. See also Striking Down Tort Reform, supra note 74, at 806
(“Emphasizing separationist principles, the Sheward opinion advanced awkwardly from its
scrutiny of seven individual provisions of H.B. 350 to declare that the reform act was
unconstitutional in its entirety.”).
167

The author argues that Ohio courts should not use a separation of powers approach
when examining allegedly reenacted statutes. Only when the behavior of the general assembly
is so outrageous as to effectively deny the legitimacy of a court’s dispositive constitutional
ruling should separation of powers even be considered. In those rare cases, further
clarification of the underlying error may very well fall on deaf ears and an admonishment may
be necessary. However, this stick should be used sparingly, because not only does it produce
a distorted vision of the law but it fosters animosity between co-equal branches.
168
“The Supreme Court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts
of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. . . . All
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and evidentiary rules.169 In light of explicit constitutional language vesting this
power in the judiciary, the legislature’s attempt to annex this authority is
indefensible.170
III. CONCLUSION
In the end, “the difficulties of producing consistent, principled answers to these
problems suggest that the concept of separation of powers provides less a rule of
decision than a heuristic concept for structuring analysis.”171 Perhaps it is best that
the separation of powers concept is amorphous and that “it is practically impossible
to distinctly define the line of demarcation between the different departments of
government.”172 Since the theory is so entangled with notions of civil government
and liberty, rigorous debate should be welcomed.
But the concept need not be so abstract as to produce unsuitable real world
results and indefensible theoretical conclusions. A separation of powers analysis
should begin by identifying the governmental actors, whether they be executive,
legislative, judicial, or an administrative branch. The appropriate threshold questions
should then be asked and the actions of the alleged transgressor thoroughly analyzed.
Evidence of legal authority for the action, or a lack of any legal bar, and proof that
the action might be upheld under different facts favor the implementation of a
functional solution. Where law, history, public policy, or a combination thereof
prevent the contested action and demand a clear demarcation of duties, a formal
approach is usually warranted.

laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken
effect.” OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
169
See Sheward, 86 Ohio St. 3d at 478-79, 715 N.E.2d at 1087-88 (noting that H.B. 350
attempts to impose a certificate-of-merit procedural requirement contrary to the rule
enunciated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Rockey v. 84 Lumber Co., 66 Ohio St. 3d 221, 611
N.E.2d 789 (1993)); id. at 490-91, 715 N.E.2d at 1095-96 (stating that H.B. 350 orders courts
to impose a standard of summary judgment different than that established by the Ohio
Supreme Court in Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 73 Ohio St. 3d 679, 653 N.E.2d 1196
(1995)); id. at 491-92, 715 N.E.2d at 1096 (finding that H.B. 350 attempts to rewrite an Ohio
rule of evidence articulated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Ede v. Atrium S. OB-GYN, Inc., 71
Ohio St. 3d 124, 642 N.E.2d 365 (1994)).
170

However, these provisions are also severable from the rest of H.B. 350.

171

Entin, supra note 13, at 221. See also DeRolph v. Ohio, 93 Ohio St. 3d 309, 327, 754
N.E.2d 1184, 1203 (2001) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“Thus, it is clear that the concept of the
separation of powers is a political doctrine rather than a technical rule of law.”).
172

Fairview v. Giffee, 73 Ohio St. 183, 186-87, 76 N.E. 865, 866 (1905).
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